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	This matter came on for trial before a single justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court, pursuant to Maine Bar Rule 7.1(e)(3)(C) and 7.2(b)(1), upon
the information filed by the Board of Overseers of the Bar alleging that
Attorney Thomas Mangan has, among other things, conducted himself in a
manner unworthy of an attorney.  Trial was held over three days, January 11
through 13, 2000.  The Board was represented by Attorney J. Scott Davis. 
Mr. Mangan was represented by Attorney Leonard Sharon.  The Board
presented six witnesses:  Thuy Thi R., Officer Randy Haussman, Barry R.,
Attorney Richard Berne, Sgt. Michael McGonagle, and Be Tucci-Gagne.  In
addition to his own testimony, Mr. Mangan presented six witnesses:  Officer
Lee Jones, Thuy Thi R., John Violette, James D. Amerault, Roland Berry, and
Leo Soucy.
	The Board alleges multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, but at the heart of the Board's allegations are its contentions
that Mr. Mangan engaged in a sexual relationship with a client, Thuy Thi R. 
The Board must prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Maine Bar Rule 7.2(b)(4).  
	The Board has alleged four specific instances or courses of conduct
undertaken by Mr. Mangan in violation of the following provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:  3.1(a); 3.2(f)(2), (3), (4); 3.4(b)(1);
3.4(f)(1); 3.6(a)(3); 3.6(e)(1), (2); and 3.7(d).  The specific allegations may
be summarized as follows:
	1.  Mr. Mangan made inappropriate use of his client
escrow account to pay a retainer on Ms. R.'s behalf to Attorney
William Cote.

	2.  Mr. Mangan neglected legal matters entrusted to him
and failed to account for receipts related to his work on behalf of
Ms. R. regarding payment of certain medical bills and his search
for the fathers of two of her daughters.

	3.  Mr. Mangan physically forced Ms. R. to have sex with
him against her will.  (This allegation does not turn on the
existence of an attorney-client relationship.)

	4.  Mr. Mangan engaged in a sexual relationship with
Ms. R. at a time when Ms. R. was a client of Mr. Mangan, the
relationship adversely affected his representation of her, and
Mr. Mangan abused the attorney-client relationship in the
context of the sexual relationship.


	One of the most important issues for determination by the court is the
credibility of the two primary witnesses to the events at issue:  Ms. R. and
Mr. Mangan.  Although both individuals were credible in part, neither were
credible on all issues.  Having considered their testimony as well as the
testimony of all other witnesses along with the documentary and other
evidence offered by both parties, I make the following findings.
	Mr. Mangan is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of
Maine.  He has been practicing in the Lewiston area since approximately
1975.  He maintains a relatively small private practice and is a sole
practitioner.  He is subject to the provisions of the Code.  
	Ms. R. was born in Vietnam.  She came to America in 1972.  She has
three daughters.  The oldest, Sue, is now 30 years old.  Sue's father is
Donald A., an American serviceman.  Ms. R. did not marry Donald A.  Cathy,
now 28, is the daughter of Robert B., also an American serviceman.  Ms. R.
was not married to Robert B.  Ms. R. married Keith N. sometime in 1972,
and he adopted Cathy and Sue.  Ms. R. was later divorced from Keith N. 
Ms. R. married Barry R. in 1978, and they have one daughter, Marie.  Ms. R.
and Barry R. are now separated.  
	Ms. R. has been in this country for approximately 28 years.  She
understands English quite well and speaks relatively clearly except when
she is under pressure.  She also reads English relatively well, but does not
write well.  She has a history of psychological fragility and depression.  She
has been treated by a number of physicians and has been prescribed anti-
depressant medication.  She has intentionally overmedicated herself upon
	Sometime in the early eighties, probably 1983, Ms. R. approached
Mr. Mangan to seek his legal assistance in obtaining child support from
Keith N.  He agreed to assist her, but shortly thereafter he received a letter
from Attorney John Hamilton, indicating that Hamilton had been asked to
take over Ms. R.'s representation and asking that Mr. Mangan turn over
Ms. R.'s file.  Mr. Mangan did so.
	Mr. Mangan had no further contact with Ms. R. until she sought him
out again in 1990.  She had been prosecuting a worker's compensation
claim through Attorney John Sedgewick.  Although she had been less than
successful in her claim, she had received $4000 for the payment of medical
bills.  Because her medical bills exceeded that amount, she asked
Mr. Mangan if he would negotiate with the medical providers in order to pay
her obligations at less than the outstanding amount due.  Mr. Mangan agreed
to take her case.  He did not enter into a fee agreement with Ms. R. and
expected to do the work pro bono.  He took the check, deposited it in his
client escrow account, and paid a number of her medical bills.  He was
successful in obtaining a reduction in the debt on several of the bills.  By
sometime in July of 1992, Mr. Mangan had paid out approximately $4100 on
behalf of Ms. R.  Nonetheless, Ms. R. continued to receive phone calls from
creditors and was never clear on what had been paid and what had not. 
Mr. Mangan did not tell her when he had concluded that work, he never
gave her an accounting of the payments he made on her behalf, and he never
sought payment from Ms. R. for his work.
	Although the exact dates are uncertain, Ms. R. next approached
Mr. Mangan about locating the fathers for her two older girls.  Her first
contact with Mr. Mangan's office regarding this issue was with Mr. Mangan's
secretary.  It is probable that this occurred in the summer of 1992.  Ms. R.
wanted to find the fathers for the girls' peace of mind and for medical
history information even though the adoption by Keith N. meant that the
fathers would have no legal obligation to Ms. R. or the girls.  Mr. Mangan told
her that he was good at such searches and that he would undertake the
search for her.  He expected the search would take approximately six
months, and he told her that she could pay him when the search was
completed.  Again, he did not specify his expected compensation, and he
did not enter into a fee agreement of any kind.  Ms. R. expected that she
would pay somehow, but did not know when or how much.  
	Sometime after agreeing to undertake the search for the fathers, in
1992 or 1993, Mr. Mangan began having a consensual sexual relationship
with Ms. R.  Mr. Mangan initiated that relationship, and Ms. R. was, for a
while, a willing participant.  At the time the sexual relationship began,
Mr. Mangan had given her no final accounting on the medical bills,{1} and he
was still searching for her daughters' fathers.  He did not ever clarify the
completion of the medical bills work, nor did he tell her that he should not
act as her lawyer while they were having a relationship.  He did not ever
formally notify her that he had ceased his work on the search for the
fathers, and he did not attend to it diligently.   
	The two met for sex regularly over several years.  During part of this
time Mr. Mangan was separated from his wife, and he made that known to
Ms. R.  He was not honest with Ms. R., however, about the length of that
separation, and Ms. R. later learned that Mr. Mangan had reconciled with his
wife and returned to the home.  
	Ms. R. was still living with Mr. R. and their daughter when the
relationship with Mr. Mangan began.  One evening when Ms. R. was at
Mr. Mangan's law office for a sexual encounter, her husband appeared at the
office.  After an unpleasant moment or two, Ms. R. left and went home. 
Mr. R. did not explicitly accuse Mr. Mangan of having an affair with Ms. R.,
and the pair was not sure what he knew.  Ms. R. eventually separated from
her husband.
	Sometime after the relationship began, Mr. Mangan began giving
Ms. R. money.  This occurred primarily after her separation from her
husband.  Ms. R. felt that her husband was not giving her enough money to
run the household, and Mr. Mangan gave her the money to help her with
extras.  In the beginning, Mr. Mangan gave her cash, but later wrote checks. 
Frequently, he gave her $150 a week.  He continued to give her money
throughout most of the relationship.
	After Ms. R. and her husband separated, Ms. R. wanted to obtain a
court order to require him to pay child support for Marie.  Mr. Mangan
understood that he might become a witness in the proceeding because of
the incident at his office.  He referred Ms. R. to Attorney Bill Cote.  Although
Mr. Mangan points to that referral as evidence that he knew he could not act
as her attorney and have a relationship with her, I conclude that he referred
her to Mr. Cote because of the potential embarrassment to himself if he
continued representing her and was called as a witness.  
	In order to pay Mr. Cote's retainer, Mr. Mangan put his own money
into his client escrow account.  He then wrote a check to Mr. Cote from that
account in the amount of $2000 on Ms. R.'s behalf.  Mr. Cote undertook the
	The Board's first allegation regarding forced sex relates to an incident
on December 5, 1993.  Ms. R. testified that on that day, she went to meet
Mr. Mangan at his office; that he wanted to have sex; that even though Ms. R.
did not want to have sex, she "did anyway;" and that Mr. Mangan did not
wear a condom, as he usually did.  Afterwards, Ms. R. began to be afraid that
she might have contracted a disease or become pregnant.  Eventually that
afternoon, she drove to the sexual assault unit of Central Maine Medical
Center.  She did not disclose the person with whom she had sex, but she
did indicate her fear of pregnancy and she received an oral contraceptive to
prevent pregnancy.{2} She indicated that she had been assaulted in the early
	On the day that Ms. R. received that treatment, Mr. Mangan went with
his wife and several members of the Lions Club to a Lions Club meeting in
Kittery.  The group left at approximately 8:00 a.m. and returned in late
afternoon.  Ms. R. went to the hospital at 3:40 in the afternoon after having
waited several hours while deciding what to do.  It is not likely that
Mr. Mangan spent any time with Ms. R. on December 5, 1993.  I cannot
conclude that it is more likely than not that this incident occurred as Ms. R.
said it did.  In any event, the relationship continued, and Ms. R. continued to
have consensual sex with Mr. Mangan.
	Eventually the relationship between Mr. Mangan and Ms. R. became
strained. Ms. R. was continuing to struggle with depression.  In
approximately October of 1996, she demanded more money than
Mr. Mangan was willing to give her.{3}  She began calling his office incessantly
when he did not give her what she asked.  Many of those calls were
"trapped," with the assistance of the phone company, by Carol Mangan,
Mr. Mangan's wife, who worked at that time as a secretary in his office.  The
police investigated, and Ms. R. initially blamed the calls on her daughter. 
She later admitted she had made the calls herself.
	Mr. Mangan attempted to convince Ms. R. to stop making the calls and
told her that he would continue giving her money for several weeks.  She
pressed him for information on the fathers and for more money.  
	The second allegation of forced sex relates to an incident in January of
1997.  Late in that month, Mr. Mangan took a trip to see his son in Florida. 
He told Ms. R., inaccurately, that he would be going to Boston and that he
would be bringing back good news about his search for the fathers.  When he
arrived at her house, he did not have any news, he just told her, as he had
previously, that he was "getting close."  While at her house, Mr. Mangan had
sex with Ms. R.  Although she did not want to have sex, she did not object. 
She was acutely disappointed that he did not have new information
regarding the fathers.{4}
	After he left, she became very upset and took too much of her
prescribed medication and called the police.  A Lewiston police officer was
dispatched to Ms. R.'s house to deal with a possible drug overdose.  Ms. R.
handed the officer three pill bottles-Ativan, Trazadone, and Effexor.  She
was tearful and distraught and was taken to the hospital by ambulance.  At
the hospital, she alleged that she had been forced to have sex against her
will.  She indicated that she had not physically resisted, but had not wanted
to have sex.  She repeatedly refused to identify the man involved.  A rape kit
was use to collect evidence, including fluids.  The detectives investigating
the case sought Ms. R. out at a later date, again asking her to identify the
man.  She said that he was an important member of the community and
consistently refused to disclose his name.  After making persistent efforts to
obtain the name of the man in question, the police determined that Ms. R.
would not provide the name and closed their investigation.  The rape kit was
eventually destroyed. 
	Months later, Ms. R. called the detective and reported that
Mr. Mangan was the man she had referred to on January 24, 1997.  Although
I do find that Mr. Mangan went to her house that day, had sex with her, and
continued to promise progress on the search for the fathers, I cannot find
that the Board has met its burden in demonstrating that Mr. Mangan raped
Ms. R. on the date in question.  The account Ms. R. gave on the date of her
admission provides the best description of the occurrence.  As recorded by
Officer McGonagle, Ms. R. told the hospital staff that "this male came over to
her residence and had sex with her.  She did not want intercourse but did
not resist.  She feels that not providing the sex will result in her never
finding her children."{5}  I conclude that although Ms. R. did not personally
want to have sex with Mr. Mangan, she did so nonetheless, in an attempt to
avoid Mr. Mangan's displeasure, and she did not communicate her feelings
to him.
	As the relationship deteriorated, both parties began to threaten each
other.  Ms. R. threatened to expose Mr. Mangan, and Mr. Mangan threatened
to "take her down with him."  He also told her that no one would believe
her stories.
	In February of 1997, Ms. R. again sought money from Mr. Mangan
reminding him that she had been abandoned by both her husband and
Mr. Mangan.  He gave her another $210.  In May, after a trip to visit family in
Kansas, she again threatened him if he failed to give her more money.  At
that point he declined to give her any more money and told her to "do what
she had to do."  On June 9, 1997, that she called the police and told them
that it was Mr. Mangan who had sex with her against her will on January 24,
1997.  She then sought out another attorney, Richard Berne, intending to
sue Mr. Mangan for his actions.  Mr. Mangan did not carry malpractice
coverage, and she did not pursue the action.
	I am convinced that when Ms. R. came to understand fully that
Mr. Mangan had abused his relationship with her, she attempted to obtain a
financial advantage through that knowledge.  Her repeated phone calls and
her demands for money from October of 1996 through June of 1997 belie
her assertion that she just wanted to end the relationship completely in the
fall of 1996.  I am also convinced that the sexual relationship between
Mr. Mangan and Ms. R., spanning several years, was, at least initially,
consensual.  I am not persuaded that she originally had sex with him only, as
she said, because "he [sic] my lawyer."  Nor do I believe that she asked him
about his search for the fathers "every day," over the course of the
relationship, thereby keeping the attorney-client relationship foremost in
his mind.  
	I am convinced, however, that Mr. Mangan began the sexual
relationship with Ms. R. during a time when he was acting as her attorney.  
I am also convinced that Mr. Mangan used information gained in his
attorney-client relationship to initiate the sexual relationship and in so
doing took advantage of her personal situation as well as her desire to find
the fathers.{6}  Further, I am persuaded that he used that information to
manipulate Ms. R. in order to maintain a continuing sexual relationship at a
time when she would have chosen to cease her contact with him.
	That Mr. Mangan used his search for the fathers to manipulate Ms. R.
became clear through his own testimony to that effect that, although he did
find Sue's father, Donald A., he did not tell Ms. R., choosing instead to "hold
onto it" until he had news about both fathers.  When he became angry with
her, probably in late January of 1997, he "chucked it all," thereby
destroying any important information he had obtained during the search.  It
is evident then that he misled Ms. R. regarding the success of his search,
and he destroyed or made unavailable to her whatever results he had
obtained when their personal relationship became difficult.  
	In sum, Mr. Mangan allowed his personal relationship with Ms. R. to
affect his work for her, he took advantage of knowledge gained in his
attorney-client relationship with Ms. R. in order to pursue and continue that
sexual relationship, and he used his search for the fathers to coerce a
continuing sexual relationship with her.
	Based on all of the evidence presented and the above findings, I draw
the following conclusions regarding the Board's allegations.
Allegation 1:Mr. Mangan made inappropriate use of his client escrow
account in order to pay a retainer on Ms. R.'s behalf to Attorney
William Cote.  See M. Bar R. 3.1(a) and 3.6(e)(1), (2).

	"No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited" in a
client escrow account.  See M. Bar R. 3.6(e)(1), (2).  I conclude that the
Board has met its burden of proving that Mr. Mangan placed his own funds
into his client escrow account, and that from those funds he wrote a check
to Attorney Cote on behalf of Ms. R.  Whether he did so in order to obscure
his personal relationship with Ms. R. or in order to avoid the appearance of a
violation of M. Bar R. 3.7(d) is not important.  This use of his client escrow
account for this purpose constituted an unmistakable violation of Rule
3.6(e)(1), and was conduct unworthy of an attorney for purposes of Rule
3.1(a).  I further find that this incident was not a simple accounting error or
misunderstanding, but represented Mr. Mangan's failure to keep himself
conversant with the rules regarding the use of his client escrow account. 
Allegation 2:Mr. Mangan neglected legal matters entrusted to him and
failed to account for receipts related to his work on behalf of
Ms. R. regarding payment of certain medical bills, and his
search for the fathers of two of her daughters.  See M. Bar R.
3.1(a), 3.6(a)(3), and 3.6(e)(2)(iii).

	"A lawyer shall not . . . neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer."
M. Bar R. 3.6(a)(3).  "A lawyer shall. . . maintain complete records of all
funds, securities and other properties of a client coming into possession of
the lawyer and render prompt and appropriate accounts to the client
regarding them."  M. Bar R. 3.6(e)(2)(iii). 
	Mr. Mangan failed to keep Ms. R. aware of his efforts and progress
both with regard to the payment of her medical bills and the search for the
fathers.  He did not diligently pursue the search for the fathers.  Although
his willingness to undertake certain work pro bono is laudable, Mr. Mangan
never made clear to Ms. R. his intent to work on a pro bono basis. 
Moreover, regardless of his own decision not to charge a client, Mr. Mangan
must comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.  He is not relieved
of his duties under the Code merely because he expects that he may never
receive compensation.  While the client's resources may restrict the amount
of services that may be obtained from an attorney, an attorney is not free to
accept a client, to promise that work will be done and then fail to attend to
the task in a reasonable period of time.   
	I also conclude that Mr. Mangan failed to account for the expenditures
from the $4000 check given to him by Ms. R.  He failed to inform her of the
creditors' positions as the work progressed, and he failed to inform her
when he had completed the work.  He further failed to diligently pursue the
search for the fathers.  He was neither punctual in his commitments nor did
he take reasonable measures to keep his client informed on the status of her
affairs.  He failed to keep her informed of progress, telling her regularly that
he was "getting close," and, when she threatened to complain about his
work to the authorities, he "chucked it all" apparently destroying any
records he had gathered to date.{7}
	I conclude, therefore, that Mr. Mangan violated M. Bar R. 3.6(a)(3) and
3.6(e)(2)(iii), and that these violations were conduct unworthy of an attorney
pursuant to M. Bar R. 3.1(a).
Allegation 3:Mr. Mangan physically forced Ms. R. to have sex with him
against her will.  See M. Bar R. 3.1(a), 3.2(f)(2), or (4).

	Although I conclude, as found both in the specific factual findings and
the conclusions set out below, that Mr. Mangan made inappropriate use of
his attorney-client relationship with Ms. R. to obtain and continue a sexual
relationship with her, I find that the Board has not met its burden with
regard to the two specific incidents of alleged physically forced sexual
activity.  Therefore, I conclude that the Board has not proven a violation of
M. Bar R. 3.1(a) or 3.2(f)(2) or (4) on that basis.

Allegation 4:Mr. Mangan engaged in a sexual relationship with Ms. R. at a
time when Ms. R. was a client of Mr. Mangan, the relationship
adversely affected his representation of her, and Mr. Mangan
abused the attorney-client relationship in the context of the
sexual relationship.  See M. Bar R. 3.1(a); 3.2(f)(2), (3) (4);
3.4(b)(1); 3.4(f)(1);{8} and 3.6(a)(3).

	No rule starkly prohibits a sexual relationship between an attorney and
a client.  The Code of Professional Responsibility makes clear, however, that
the "prohibition of certain conduct in this Code is not to be interpreted as
an approval of conduct not specifically mentioned."  M. Bar R. 3.1(a).
Moreover, the Code does expressly prohibit conduct that may redound to
the detriment of a client's legal interests.{9}  "A lawyer shall not . . . continue
representation of a client if the representation would involve a conflict of
interest . . . .  Representation would involve a conflict of interest if there is a
substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of [the] client would be
materially and adversely affected . . . by the lawyer's own interests."  M. Bar
R. 3.4(b)(1).  "A lawyer shall not . . . neglect a legal matter entrusted to the
lawyer."  M. Bar R. 3.6(a)(3).  Therefore, although a sexual relationship
between an attorney and client will not constitute a per se violation of the
Code, any such relationship that puts the client's legal interests at a
disadvantage or prevents the attorney from diligently pursuing the client's
causes will constitute a violation of the cited sections.
	Thus, the questions presented are:  (1) did Mr. Mangan have a sexual
relationship with Ms. R.; (2) did Mr. Mangan have an attorney-client
relationship with Ms. R. during that time, and, more specifically, did the
search for the fathers, on the facts of this case, constitute the practice of
law; and (3) if so, did his sexual relationship with a client result in the
violation of any rule contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
	The Board has met its burden in proving that Mr. Mangan engaged in a
sexual relationship Ms. R.  Indeed, Mr. Mangan does not dispute that
relationship although he has minimized the time during which the
relationship existed, and the effects of the relationship on Ms. R.  
	Mr. Mangan does, however, dispute the existence of an attorney-client
relationship with Ms. R., claiming that he undertook the search for her
daughters' fathers as part of a "hobby."  I reject his analysis.
	Mr. Mangan has cited multiple cases from other states addressing the
definition of the practice of law.  Any number of different formulations can
be cited.{10}  As attorneys' roles increase in complexity and overlap with other
professions, the answer to that question will continue to evolve.  Ultimately,
the question will turn on the specific facts of the work undertaken and the
understanding of the parties. In determining whether Mr. Mangan was
engaged in the practice of law, I have looked to, among other things, the
understanding of both Ms. R. and Mr. Mangan, the trust and confidence
reposed in Mr. Mangan by Ms. R., the context in which the request for
services arose-both physical and conceptual, the skills necessary to the
completion of the services, the need for discretion and confidentiality in
rendering the services, and the nature of the services themselves.
	Mr. Mangan's agreement to assist Ms. R. in finding the girls' fathers
occurred entirely in a setting that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that he accepted the task as her attorney, and Ms. R. did
reasonably believe that he was her attorney for that purpose.  Ms. R. came to
Mr. Mangan as a result of his previous legal work for her.  He undertook the
work in the same fashion as he had previously undertaken other legal work
for her-with little written record, no fee agreement, no contract for
services, and financial arrangements that were vague at best. 
	The requested assistance, although not in the nature of litigation
services, falls well within the broad range of issues upon which an attorney
may be expected to provide legal assistance.  Contrary to Mr. Mangan's
argument, the search for the fathers was not a task wholly distinct from the
role of an attorney.  While it is possible for the same task to be undertaken,
albeit in a different manner and with fewer protections for the
confidentiality of the "client," by one not schooled in the law, the same can
be said for many services provided to clients by their lawyers.{11}  Ms. R.
sought out an attorney to assist her in the search, and could reasonably
assume that an attorney would have skills not otherwise available in a
nonlawyer, that is, that an attorney who agreed to undertake the search
would be conversant with a variety of methods used to locate people and
could undertake the search, using his legal skills, in a confidential and
discreet manner. 
	Furthermore, Ms. R. provided Mr. Mangan with intimate, personal
information regarding her past which she had every reason to expect that he
would keep confidential.  He did not tell her that he would not be acting as
her attorney in this endeavor.  He met with her at his office to discuss the
issues.  He asked for and she brought to his law office a picture of one of the
men for whom Mr. Mangan had agreed to search.  
	I conclude, therefore, that the facts point compellingly toward the
practice of law and an attorney-client relationship.  The putative client
sought Mr. Mangan out at his office, made contact through his secretary,
gave him detailed personal information regarding her past, and was assured
that he would undertake the search.  In undertaking the search, Mr. Mangan
could be expected to bring to bear his knowledge and skills as an attorney,
his ability to communicate persuasively, his understanding of the record-
keeping capacities of governmental agencies, and his knowledge of the
distinctions between confidential information and information made public
by law.  Mr. Mangan was acting in the capacity of an attorney when he
undertook the task of finding the fathers, and Ms. R. would have been
warranted in assuming that he undertook to find the fathers in his capacity
as an attorney.{12} 
	Because the mere fact of a sexual relationship with a client does not,
in itself, constitute a violation of any specific bar rule, it is necessary to
address the specifics of the relationship with regard to Mr. Mangan's
representation of Ms. R.  I am persuaded that the relationship adversely
affected Ms. R.'s legal interests and that Mr. Mangan did not pursue the
search for the fathers with the same diligence he would have applied had he
not gained an advantage in his relationship with Ms. R. by deferring
resolution of the quest.  I therefore conclude that Mr. Mangan's own
interests adversely affected his representation of Ms. R.  He did not
diligently pursue the search for the fathers, and he ultimately destroyed all
progress on the search when he became angry at her in late 1996 or early
1997.  These actions constituted a violation of M. Bar R. 3.4(b)(1) and
	In addition, the facts in this case demonstrate another significant yet
subtle detriment of a sexual relationship between an attorney and client. 
When an attorney enters into a sexual relationship with a client, the client
may feel pressured into continuing that relationship for reasons directly
related to the attorney's role.  Although, again, no rule expressly addresses
these results in terms of forbidding a sexual relationship with a client, I
conclude that M. Bar R. 3.2(f)(3) and (4) apply to this aspect of Mr. Mangan's
conduct.  "A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving . . . 
misrepresentation [or] . . . conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice."  Id.  The abuse of the trust and confidence that a client places in
an attorney and the abuse of confidential information gained in the attorney-
client relationship would constitute violations of those provisions as would
misrepresentation of the progress of legal work undertaken.
	 Here, Ms. R. had little or no money with which to pay Mr. Mangan for
his work in locating the fathers.  He was well aware of her limited finances. 
He used his knowledge of her private life, gained through representing her,
to his own advantage and to her disadvantage.  He knew her to have had a
difficult past with men; he knew that she was seeing a psychiatrist and was
heavily medicated; and he knew that she had difficulties with written
English.{14}  He gained most or all of that information through his
representation of her.  He continued to press her for sex, while continuing
to assure her that he was getting close in his efforts to find the two men. 
Ms. R. felt "trapped."  She had limited emotional strength to draw upon,
and she believed Mr. Mangan to be an important member of the legal
community.  He manipulated her by stringing out his search for the fathers,
and by assuring her that no one would believe her if she chose to stop seeing
him and disclose his misdeeds.  
	In sum, the facts lead inescapably to the conclusion that Mr. Mangan
took advantage of a client.  I conclude that Mr. Mangan's use of information
gained through the existence of an attorney-client relationship and the
abuse of the trust and confidence obtained through that relationship to
obtain and coerce a continuing sexual relationship with Ms. R. was conduct
unworthy of an attorney, conduct involving misrepresentation, and conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.  See M. Bar R. 3.1(a) and
3.2(f)(3), (4). 
	The Board having met its burden of proof, it is hereby adjudged that
Mr. Mangan has violated M. Bar R. 3.1(a); 3.2(f)(3), (4); 3.4(b)(1); 3.6(a)(3);
and 3.6(e)(1), (2)(iii).  Based on these conclusions, sanctions are warranted. 
A hearing on sanctions will be scheduled at the earliest opportunity.
	Dated:  February 28, 2000

							Leigh I. Saufley
							Associate Justice
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . He was called upon by Ms. R. in 1993 to assist her in understanding her credit report as it related to the payment of the medical bills. {2} . Ms. R.'s husband found the "Aftercare Instructions," regarding the treatment and medications she received, crumpled on the floor of the garage and became angry when Ms. R. would not disclose the man involved. The marriage fell apart after that incident. {3} . Ms. R.'s supervisor testified that Ms. R. had lost her job at Caswell's Food Liquidation Center as a result of her frequent medication overusage. It is not clear whether she obtained other employment. {4} . In fact, by that time, Mr. Mangan did have information regarding Donald A., but did not pass it on to Ms. R. {5} . The hospital apparently misunderstood her search for her daughters' fathers. {6} . Ms. R. was embarrassed about having had three daughters with three different men, only one of whom she had married. {7} . Although he testified that he threw away all of his search efforts, some documents remained and appear in the record. {8} . M. Bar R. 3.4(f)(1) speaks only to the commencement of representation where there is a conflict of interest. Mr. Mangan had already undertaken representation of Ms. R. when he began to have a sexual relationship with her. {9} . It is important to distinguish between bad judgment or bad behavior generally in sexual relationships and bad behavior that finds its source in the attorney's profession. {10} . Not surprisingly, the Code does not attempt to define the "practice of law" because the definition must be determined in the context of facts unique to each situation. The existence of the relationship will be dependent in great part on the understanding of the putative client and, to a certain extent, the attorney. It may be "implied from the conduct of the parties." Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Dineen, 500 A.2d 262, 264-65 (Me. 1985). Accordingly, I have not attempted herein a more precise definition of the practice of law, nor have I included a review of those cases, nationwide, where courts have struggled with the definition in other contexts. {11} . An example is the work that Mr. Mangan undertook on Ms. R.'s behalf to convince the medical service providers to accept less than full payment on each bill. Although a nonattorney could have assisted her in that task, it cannot be disputed that she became Mr. Mangan's client when he agreed to negotiate on her behalf. {12} . Even if Mr. Mangan's services to Ms. R. in the search for the fathers constituted only "law-related services," Mr. Mangan would still be subject to the Code of Professional Responsibility. See M. Bar R. 3.2(h)(1)(i). {13} . Because the only matters properly before the court for adjudication are the alleged violations of the Code of Professional Conduct, this opinion does not address related concepts of breach of fiduciary duty. {14} . "The factors leading to the client's trust and reliance on the lawyer also have the potential for placing the lawyer in a position of dominance and the client in a position of vulnerability. . . . Thus, the more vulnerable the client, the heavier the obligation of the lawyer to avoid engaging in any relationship other than that of attorney-client." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992).