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			v.						)		FINAL JUDGMENT

	Findings and conclusions were entered in this matter on February 28,
2000, and are incorporated herein.  A hearing on sanctions was scheduled
for Wednesday, March 1, 2000.  At the request of Mr. Mangan and Attorney
Sharon, the matter was continued to March 8, 2000, to allow Mr. Mangan
further time to prepare to address the Court.  Having heard from counsel,
Mr. Mangan, and Ms. R., sanctions are entered, pursuant to M. Bar R.
7.2(b)(5), based on the following analysis.
	The primary focus of the Court in determining the appropriate
sanction must be Mr. Mangan's conduct in abusing his relationship with a
client to gain and continue a sexual relationship with her.  This does not
mean, however, that his conduct in misusing his client trust account, failing
to account for his client's moneys and failing to diligently pursue his client's
request that he locate the fathers of her daughters can be lightly dismissed. 
Nonetheless, my analysis will focus primarily on the most egregious
behavior, the misconduct involved in the sexual relationship with a client.
	Any analysis of the appropriate sanction to be imposed must
necessarily begin with the purpose of the rules.  See M. Bar R. 2(a).  A
proceeding of this nature constitutes "an inquiry to determine the fitness of
an officer of the court to continue in that capacity."  Id.  It is important for
all parties to keep in mind the admonition in the rules that the goal of the
Court today "is not punishment but protection of the public and the courts
from attorneys who by their conduct have demonstrated that they are
unable, or likely to be unable, to discharge properly their professional
duties."  Id.  Thus, in determining whether the sanction, if any, for the
conduct at issue should consist of a reprimand, a suspension for a definite
period, or disbarment, see M. Bar R. 7.2(b)(5),  I look to the efficacy of each
sanction in helping to assure that Mr. Mangan would not conduct himself in
a similar fashion in the future.
	In determining the appropriate sanction in this matter, I have looked
to the following sources for guidance:  M. Bar R. 7.1(e)(2)(D);{1} Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanction promulgated by the American Bar Association;{2}
and sanctions imposed on other attorneys as a result of prior decisions of
the Board, single justices, and the Law Court in Maine.  I have also
considered decisions from other jurisdictions provided to me by counsel,
particularly those addressing sanctions imposed on attorneys who have
taken advantage of clients through sexual relationships.  To organize the
facts considered, I have used the framework suggested by the ABA Model
Standards and M. Bar R. 7.1(e)(2)(D).
A.  What duties were breached?
	As noted in the findings entered earlier in this case, the mere fact
that an attorney has a sexual relationship with a client does not, in itself,
violate the provisions of the code.  Whether an attorney may ever enter into
a sexual relationship with a current client without being found to have
violated a duty to that client is not before this Court.  Despite Mr. Mangan's
protestations to the contrary, the facts at bar do not demonstrate a sexual
relationship that just happened to coexist with an attorney-client
relationship.  Instead, it is evident that Mr. Mangan used his role as an
attorney to obtain and continue a sexual relationship with a vulnerable client. 
His use of confidential information gained through his legal work for Ms. R.
and his manipulation of the search for the fathers to coerce her continuing
compliance were actions that violated his primary duty to his client; that is,
to conduct himself in a manner that is not "adverse" to his client.  See
M. Bar R. 3.4(b)(1).  The abuse of the confidence and trust of the client in
such a fashion is entirely counter to the duties owed to a client.
	Separately, Mr. Mangan violated his duty to account to his client for
the expenditure of her funds, and violated his duty of diligence in pursuing
the assistance she sought.  He also violated his duty to the public and his
clients in general by misusing his client trust fund.  These errors would be
of less concern to the Court had Mr. Mangan not been subject to disciplinary
proceedings for similar conduct in the past.
B.  What was Mr. Mangan's mental state at the time of his breach of duty?
	The question presented by this inquiry is whether Mr. Mangan acted
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.  This question highlights
the difficulty presented by the particular facts of this case.  I conclude that
Mr. Mangan did intentionally seek out a sexual relationship with a woman he
knew, through his law practice, to be vulnerable-emotionally, financially,
and culturally.  I further conclude that he gained this knowledge through his
representation of her.  More seriously, this is not the first time Mr. Mangan
made sexual advances to a similarly vulnerable client.  Thus, it appears that
Mr. Mangan takes advantage of women in need of assistance.  To the extent
that two women can constitute a pattern, this would be a dangerous pattern.
	The fact that Mr. Mangan wrongly used the knowledge, power, and
control he obtained through his profession in order to obtain an intimate
personal relationship is clear.  What is much more complex is his state of
mind in doing so.  I believe that Mr. Mangan's assertions that he was, for a
time, in love with Ms. R. are genuine.  He did attempt to assist her
financially, and thought of himself as taking care of her.  Unfortunately, the
result is the same whether he developed a real affection for her or not.  His
behavior constituted a breach of trust and manipulation for his own personal
advantage.  I must conclude that his conduct was knowing and reckless at
the same time.
	With regard to his misuse of the client trust fund, I have no doubt that
Mr. Mangan was aware that he should not place his own funds in that
account and that he did so nonetheless, assuming that it was "not a big
deal."  Given his past reprimand for this same conduct, even though that
reprimand occurred many years ago, it was a big deal.
	I also conclude that he knowingly and intentionally delayed work on
finding the fathers to gain an advantage over Ms. R., that he did so to her
detriment, and that he negligently failed to attend to an accounting of the
medical bill payments.
C.  What was the extent of the injury caused by Mr. Mangan's misconduct?
	The injuries are somewhat unusual in the context of an attorney
discipline case.  Ms. R. has not likely suffered any significant financial injury
due to Mr. Mangan's conduct.  Indeed, he gave her money when she was in
difficult financial circumstances.  Nor did he neglect a litigation matter such
that she has lost a right to an adjudication.  It is likely that the search for the
fathers can be completed through others.  Although the passage of time is,
in itself, a loss for her daughters, it is unlikely that irreparable harm has
	The harm is in the nature of emotional harm to Ms. R.{3} and harm to
the "administration of justice."  More precisely, Mr. Mangan's conduct
emotionally injured a client and has injured the profession.  Ms. R. is still
struggling with the aftermath of a multi-year relationship in which she was
not always a willing participant.  Whether the troubled relationship might
have occurred even in the absence of the attorney-client relationship cannot
be known.  The fact is that Mr. Mangan used his profession and abused the
unique trust and confidence placed in him by his client to meet his own
D.  What are the aggravating and mitigating circumstances? {4}
	I find these facts in mitigation:
1.Mr. Mangan has regularly provided many hours of pro bono
service to people in need of legal assistance.  He has
consistently been willing to represent those who may have
found no other assistance in the legal community because
of their financial, and occasionally language and
educational, limitations.
	I find the following aggravating factors:
1.Mr. Mangan has been the subject of five previous
disciplinary proceedings resulting in the imposition of

(i)He received a private reprimand in 1983 for violation
of the bar rules related to the misuse of his client
trust account. 

(ii)He received another private reprimand in 1985 for
failing to account to a client as to the specific manner
in which he claimed to have earned his fees.

(iii)He was reprimanded by the Grievance Commission in
1987 for failing to punctually and diligently attend to a
client's litigation responsibilities.

(iv)He received a public reprimand in 1997 for violating
the requirement that he attend to written
contingency fee agreements, and that he account to a
client's medical providers in a timely fashion.  At least
in part, that reprimand addressed issues similar to
those presented by the Board in this proceeding. 
Mr. Mangan's office practice and lack of timeliness in
accounting appear not to have improved significantly.

(v)He was suspended from practice for thirty days in
1997 as a result of a single justice's determination
that he had subjected a vulnerable female client, who
was also his employee, to unwanted sexual advances.

2.Mr. Mangan placed his own funds into his client trust fund
in order to pay Ms. R.'s retainer with another attorney,
notwithstanding a prior reprimand for placing his own
funds into that account.  In that prior reprimand, the
Commission noted concerns similar to those of this Court
that Mr. Mangan's decision to place his personal funds into
the client trust account was for purposes of deception of a
third party (in that case creditors and the IRS; here,
Attorney Cote or Barry R.).

3.Mr. Mangan's conduct with Ms. R. involved the abuse of
the trust and confidence of a client and occurred over
many months and years.  He did not, at any time, explain
that he could no longer provide legal services to her.  He
did not cease the relationship upon evidence that Ms. R.
wished to do so.  He threatened to "take her down with
him" if she exposed him.  He reminded her of his
esteemed position in the legal community.  At no time did
he recognize the coercive nature of his conduct and cease
that conduct.

4.Mr. Mangan's 1997 suspension for making improper
sexual advances to a client/employee related to incidents
in 1995 that occurred during the time that his
relationship with Ms. R. was ongoing.  In that matter, in
findings strikingly similar to those at bar, the single justice
(Clifford, J.) found that the client was vulnerable to
Mr. Mangan's advances, and that she "had little money and
was dependent on Respondent to represent her as an
attorney and to provide some part-time employment to
her."  The justice found that the client may have had a
financial motive for filing her complaint against
Mr. Mangan, but was credible nonetheless, and that
Mr. Mangan "has not acknowledged that his conduct was
improper in any way."  The justice also found that
"although Mr. Mangan used no force, the woman was "very
vulnerable and should not have been subjected to sexual

5.Finally, Mr. Mangan does not acknowledge, or even appear
to recognize, that his conduct with Ms. R. was
unacceptable.  While he is very sorry that the complaint
has led to protracted litigation with the Board and that it
has caused many problems with his own personal life, he is
not in the least contrite for the harm done to Ms. R. or to
the profession.  He remains angry and feels
misunderstood.  He has not even begun to grapple with the
difficulties caused by entering into a relationship with a
client.  If he believed he would not get caught, it is highly
likely that he would engage in the same or similar behavior

	I conclude that the Board has demonstrated more than an unintended
violation of the rules and has proved that Mr. Mangan's misconduct was
neither isolated nor inadvertent.  He has taken advantage of two vulnerable
women who came to him for legal assistance, he has been lax in accounting
for the use of clients' funds, and he has knowingly misused his client trust
	I also reject his argument that, until my ruling in this case, he could
not have known that his conduct with Ms. R. would constitute a violation of
the rules.  To the contrary, any reasonable attorney would understand that
taking sexual advantage of a vulnerable client in these circumstances is
conduct that cannot be condoned.  Nor is the determination that
Mr. Mangan actually took advantage of Ms. R. identifiable only in hindsight. 
In instigating the relationship, he was well aware that she had had a
troubled history with men, that she suffered from depression and was
emotionally fragile, that she was financially limited, that she had suffered an
injury and received little compensation, and that English was not her first
language.  To be sure, Ms. R. is an adult who had previously been
represented by other attorneys.  Had she understood the situation better
and had she been able to assert herself, she could have said no to
Mr. Mangan in no uncertain terms and could have attempted to obtain legal
assistance elsewhere.  That she did not, however, does not excuse his
	Public confidence in the profession is crucial to the administration of
justice.  People seeking the assistance of an attorney are, by definition, often
in circumstances that render them more vulnerable to exploitation.  They
must trust that placing their confidence in the hands of a member of the bar
will not subject them to further exploitation, and certainly they must trust
that confidential information conveyed will not be used to the personal
advantage of the attorney.  An attorney must be vigilant not to allow his or
her own interests to work to the disadvantage of a client. Mr. Mangan failed
to do so with Ms. R. 
	Any sanction imposed must assure that Mr. Mangan does not have
access to vulnerable female clients unless and until he comes to understand
that his conduct was unacceptable and, more importantly, why it was
unacceptable.  His previous thirty-day suspension for similar behavior has
had no effect on his understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct.{5} 
Thus, any sanction must remove Mr. Mangan from the practice of law for a
significant period of time and must preclude reinstatement until he has
demonstrated the necessary insight into his misconduct.  It must also
address his misuse of the trust fund and his lax accounting practices.
	Mr. Mangan asks that the Court impose no more than a public
reprimand.  I conclude that a reprimand would completely fail to address
the need to protect the public.  The Board seeks a full disbarment. 
Mr. Mangan's attorney suggests that a suspension for a specific period could
serve the purposes of the rules.
	As a result of Mr. Mangan's failure to address his misconduct in any
way, I have reluctantly concluded that disbarment is the appropriate
sanction for the multiple violations demonstrated by the Board.  Although I
have considered whether a suspension with conditions might accomplish
the same result in a less draconian manner, any such suspension would have
as its goal the opportunity for Mr. Mangan to meet certain identified
conditions before returning to practice.  On the facts before me, I would
have to construct those conditions out of whole cloth.  
	Mr. Mangan does not acknowledge that he committed any mistake. 
He was reluctant even to admit that his misuse of his client trust fund was
wrong and did so only by indicating that his attorney told him he must admit
that he should not have done it.  He has never apologized to Ms. R. or, to my
knowledge, to the woman addressed by Justice Clifford in the 1997
suspension.  He does not suggest any conditions under which he could more
expeditiously be returned to the practice of law.{6}  
	Given his lack of remorse, his lack of concern regarding his
accounting responsibilities, the absence of a plan to avoid future
misconduct,{7} the history of previous sanctions, and the significant risk to
the public should he continue to practice law, I find that I have no choice
but to disbar Mr. Mangan.  Reinstatement will not be considered unless and
until he has taken significant action to address the violations set out in the
findings and conclusion of February 28, 2000, and can demonstrate a real
understanding of his misconduct as well as an ability to avoid the
misconduct in the future.
	Pursuant to M. Bar R. 7.3(I)(1)(A), the disbarment shall take effect
thirty days after entry of this judgment.  Mr. Mangan shall immediately take
steps to wind up his legal responsibilities with any remaining clients and
shall comply with M. Bar R. 7.3(I)(1).	The entry is:
It is hereby ordered that Thomas Mangan is disbarred from the
practice of law.  His name shall be removed from the roll of
attorneys authorized to practice law in the State of Maine. 
Notice of disbarment shall be given pursuant to the Maine Bar

Consistent with the terms of this judgment and the findings and
conclusions previously entered, Mr. Mangan is authorized,
pursuant to M. Bar. R. 7.3(j)(1), to petition for reinstatement
after the expiration of two years from the date of this judgment.


							Leigh I. Saufley
							Associate Justice,
							Supreme Judicial Court

March 10, 2000
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . This provision of the rules directs a panel to consider, inter alia, four specific factors when determining the sanction for an attorney's misconduct. They include consideration of the duty owed, the attorney's mens rea, the injury caused by the misconduct, and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. Although no similar provision is found in the section addressing sanctions imposed by the Court, I conclude that these are appropriate factors for consideration by the Court. {2} . The model standards require inquiry on the same four issues addressed in M. Bar R. 7.1(e)(2)(D). See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Model Standard 3.0 (1992). {3} . Emotional harm in the context of attorney discipline matters ordinarily accompanies the client's distress at learning that his or her rights have been compromised by the attorney's misconduct. {4} . See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standards 9.1, 9.22, 9.32. {5} . That suspension was imposed at or after the end of his relationship with Ms. R. It cannot be expected, therefore, that it could have changed his behavior with Ms. R. It can be expected, however, that the Court's action in 1997 would have led Mr. Mangan to consider his behavior with Ms. R. in a different light and begin to understand why it constituted a violation of the code. That does not appear to have occurred. {6} . A separate sanctions hearing was scheduled in order to allow the parties, and particularly Mr. Mangan, the opportunity to argue for a more specifically tailored sanction. That hearing was then continued to allow Mr. Mangan additional time to present his argument more constructively. Despite his attorney's best efforts, however, Mr. Mangan declined the tacit invitation of the Court. {7} . Although I would have considered requiring individual counseling to assist Mr. Mangan in understanding the existence of, and harm caused by, his abuse of his role as an attorney, there is no evidence before me to indicate that such counseling could be effective.