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								SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT	Docket No. Bar 99-5

			v.						)			 ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

	Thomas Mangan has filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment seeking
to have the judgment of disbarment entered on March 10, 2000, set aside,
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).  For the reasons set out below, that motion
must be denied.

1.  Motion to Recuse the Law Court

	Preliminarily, because there has been some confusion regarding the
procedural posture of this matter, clarification is necessary.  The original
judgment was entered on March 10, 2000.  On January 16, 2001, that
judgment was affirmed by the Law Court.  On February 27, 2001, an Order of
Contempt was entered requiring Mr. Mangan to comply with certain
responsibilities set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
	After the affirmance of the judgment by the Law Court, Mr. Mangan
filed the now pending Motion for Relief from Judgment on February 7,
2001.  The Board responded to the motion on February 28, 2001.  Shortly
thereafter,  Mr. Mangan filed a Motion to Recuse the Law Court from hearing
the pending matter.  The Board responded briefly on March 9, 2001.  On
March 20, this Court received Mr. Mangan's bound version of his Motion for
Relief from Judgment with attachments and appendices.
	The confusion regarding Mr. Mangan's Motion to Recuse the Law
Court has now been cleared up.  The parties understand that the Motion for
Relief from Judgment was presented to this judge as the trial court in the
matter, and that the Law Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for relief from this Court's judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
Therefore, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Recuse the Law Court is

2.  Motion for Relief from Judgment

	Mr. Mangan has sought relief from judgment based on claims of fraud,
newly discovered evidence, mistake, and excusable neglect.  As the party
seeking relief from judgment, Mr. Mangan "bears the 'burden of proving
that the judgment should be set aside.'"  Keybank Nat'l Assoc. v. Sargent,
2000 ME 153, ¶ 13, 758 A.2d 528, 533 (citation omitted). 
	Mr. Mangan has presented multiple theories upon which he argues
that the judgment should be set aside.  I have not endeavored to address
every argument, and in several instances I have summarized or paraphrased
his arguments. 
	a.  Newly Discovered Evidence
	I address the matter of newly discovered evidence first.  Mr. Mangan
asserts that, if he were given the opportunity for the presentation of
testimony, he would present witnesses who would testify, among other
things, that Ms. R. was having affairs with other men at the time of his
relationship with her.  He would also present testimony regarding her credit
worthiness following his services to her in paying the medical bills. 
Mr. Mangan's request for a hearing on those matters was deferred pending
the parties' argument on each of the issues.  
	Having now heard Mr. Mangan's offer of proof on the issues of newly
discovered evidence, I conclude that presentation of the facts offered would
have no effect on the conclusions drawn in the original judgment.  Whether
Ms. R. was having relationships with men other than Mr. Mangan is not
relevant to his own breach of his responsibilities as an attorney.  Similarly,
the findings regarding his work for her in paying medical bills would not be
changed upon a presentation of evidence that she was credit worthy and
sought or obtained other loans following his work.  In the original judgment
I concluded that Mr. Mangan in fact paid each of the bills and may have paid
more to her medical services providers than she gave to him for
distribution.  Nonetheless, he failed to provide her with a final and complete
accounting.  The fact that she was able to obtain credit and therefore should
have understood that he had completed his work for her does not substitute
for his own responsibility to account for the funds she gave him.{1}
	b.  Fraud
	Mr. Mangan alleges several areas of fraud upon which he bases his
argument that the judgment should be set aside.  I have not herein
attempted to repeat all such allegations.  I address them generally in groups.
	Inherent in all of Mr. Mangan's claims of fraud is his insistence that
Ms. R. lied during the trial of this matter and lied in many other contexts
outside of the trial.  In essence, Mr. Mangan alleges that the Board
committed a fraud upon the Court when it (1) presented the rape allegations
notwithstanding inconsistencies in Ms. R.'s statements regarding those
allegations, and (2) attempted to obtain an advantage in the litigation by
including the egregious rape claims, thereby attempting to taint the
proceedings and sway the Court.  Mr. Mangan also alleges that Ms. R.
committed a fraud upon the court because her testimony was so incredible.  
	It should be noted that with regard to the rape allegations, I found that
the Board did not prove the claims.  Any belief on Mr. Mangan's part that the
mere existence of the allegations by the Board somehow tainted the
proceedings or pressured me into finding for the Board on other matters is
simply wrong.
	Ms. R.'s credibility was an issue throughout the trial.  The Board itself
pointed out to the court inconsistencies in some of her prior statements. 
Mr. Mangan, through very competent counsel, had an opportunity to
challenge all of her testimony, and did so effectively in many instances. 
Ultimately, I found her testimony not to be credible on a number of points.
	I conclude that Bar Counsel's decision to present Ms. R. as a witness
did not constitute a fraud on the court.  I further conclude that Ms. R.'s
inaccurate or inconsistent testimony, whether intentional or unintentional,
did not deprive Mr. Mangan of a fair trial given his opportunity to challenge
her testimony at trial and my conclusion that Ms. R. was not a fully credible
witness.  I further reject Mr. Mangan's argument that Ms. R.'s lack of
credibility in some areas required me to reject her testimony in its entirety.
c.  Excusable Neglect
	Mr. Mangan next argues that the failure on the part of Attorneys Davis
and Sharon to object to Ms. R.'s inaccurate or inconsistent testimony was
"excusable neglect."   This is just another method of arguing that Ms. R. lied
at trial and that her lies prejudiced Mr. Mangan.  Once again, I reject that
argument as a basis for setting aside the judgment.  Moreover, Attorney
Davis, as noted above, took pains to point out to the Court one particular area
of inconsistency in her testimony, and Attorney Sharon representing
Mr. Mangan, cross-examined Ms. R. extensively on issues related to
d.  Mistake, Errors in Factual Determination
	In this argument, Mr. Mangan primarily asserts that the judgment
contained errors in its factual findings regarding Ms. R.'s psychological
condition.  These matters were cognizable on direct appeal and have been
resolved by affirmance in that appeal.  Moreover, Mr. Mangan's
disagreements with the factual findings do not justify setting aside the
original judgment.
e.  Summary of Argument
	Mr. Mangan continues to search for reasons why he should not have
been sanctioned for his relationship with Ms. R. and his violations of the
Code in related matters.{2}  Mr. Mangan himself admits to having had a sexual
relationship with Ms. R. over a period of years.  Although he continues to
disagree with the legal conclusion, he did so at a time when he was acting as
her attorney.  He took advantage of information learned in the course of his
representation of her in initiating the relationship, and when that
relationship went sour, he destroyed any of the work that he had completed
regarding the search for her children's fathers.  
	Mr. Mangan does not dispute the fact of the relationship, the
inappropriate use of his client account related to Ms. R., or the ultimate
destruction of the materials related to the search.  New or more compelling
evidence that Ms. R. lied about a number of aspects of their personal
relationship, or that she was the "scorned woman" who used the Code of
Professional Responsibility to attempt to manipulate Mr. Mangan, or to
punish him, cannot change these facts.{3}  Nor does Mr. Mangan's challenge
to Ms. R.'s character alter my conclusion that he violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and refused to accept responsibility for his own
	Having considered all of the arguments presented in Mr. Mangan's
Motion for Relief from Judgment, including his offers of proof regarding
newly discovered evidence, I conclude that Mr. Mangan has not presented a
basis to set aside the original judgment and that no evidentiary hearing is
	Wherefore, the entry will be:
Motion for Relief from Judgment DENIED.

	Dated:	April 19, 2001

							Leigh I. Saufley
							Associate Justice
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . Mr. Mangan's violation of the bar rule regarding an accounting as to the medical bills did not play a significant part in the sanction ultimately imposed in this case. {2} . In support of his argument that he should not have been sanctioned, Mr. Mangan refers to Ms. R. as the "Base Hooker"; he has offered evidence that she has been charged but not convicted of shoplifting; he suggests that her daughters are not employed in the professions she testified to but are engaged as strippers or prostitutes; and he finally asks "Doesn't anyone see through this woman?" None of these allegations, if true, would excuse his serious errors in professional judgment. {3} . The original judgment contained findings that she threatened him and that she attempted to obtain a financial advantage when she understood that he would be in trouble with his professional oversight Board because of his relationship with her. {4} . Before the imposition of sanctions, Mr. Mangan was given the opportunity to present options short of disbarment that would assure protection of the public while allowing him to work toward regaining a professional standing. No such presentation was made at the hearing on sanctions.

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