Supreme Judicial Court Calendar

Daniel Wood appeals from a decision of the Superior Court affirming a decision of the commissioner of the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife revoking Wood’s hunting license for three years and his Maine Guide license for one year. Wood argues that (1) the Department erred in determining that he was subject to a mandatory suspension of his hunting license pursuant to 12 M.R.S. §10902(4)(A) because he was not convicted of a criminal offense “while on a hunting or fishing trip or in the pursuit of wild animals”; (2) section 10902(4)(A) is void for vagueness to the extent that it requires a suspension for a crime where the charging instrument did not allege hunting, fishing, or pursuing wild animals; (3) the statute and administrative process giving the Department discretion to suspend a hunting license are void for vagueness; and (4) the standards of competency for Maine Guides, which the Department determined Wood had violated, are arbitrary and delegate too much authority to the Department.

Robert Santerre appeals from the adjudication, based on his admissions, that he committed three counts of the civil violation of causing the death of a person while committing a traffic infraction.  Santerre argues that the court erred by imposing consecutive license suspensions for each of the three counts given that the three deaths occurred as a result of one act or occurrence and the relevant statutes do not permit consecutive penalties.

Robert Bocko, who was an adjunct instructor for the University of Maine School of Law, appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Superior Court in favor of the University of Maine System on Bocko’s claims for breach of contract and violation of 26 M.R.S. § 621-A, which requires payment of wages at least once every 16 days for most employees.  Bocko argues that the Superior Court erred in determining that the requirements of the statute did not apply to Bocko because he was a teacher and a salaried employee.

Hans Utsch and Julia Hazzard Merck appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying their Rule 80C appeal challenging a determination, in the form of an email, by the Department of Environmental Protection that the owners of a quarry near their residence need not file a Notice of Intent to Comply pursuant to 38 M.R.S. § 490-Y before restarting operations at the quarry.  Utsch and Merck argue that the Department and the Superior Court erred in determining that the quarry’s operations were permitted under a “grandfathering” clause in section 490-Y.

The Department cross-appeals, arguing that the Superior Court erred in (1) determining that Utsch and Hazzard Merck have standing to challenge the determination, (2) determining that the Department’s email constitutes final agency action, and (3) treating Utsch and Hazzard Merck’s Rule 80C complaint in the alternative as a request for declaratory relief.

Upon suspecting Nicholas Norris of trafficking in drugs, law enforcement obtained warrants in Penobscot County to track and search Norris’s vehicle.  Law enforcement stopped Norris’s vehicle near the border between Penobscot and Somerset Counties.  Norris was indicted in Penobscot County for trafficking in drugs.  Norris moved to suppress the traffic stop, and the trial court denied the motion. 

On the first day of trial, the State filed a notice of dismissal of the charges, stating that an investigation “suggested” that Norris was stopped in Somerset County more than 1,800 feet from the border with Penobscot County.  Norris objected to the dismissal, but the trial court accepted the dismissal. 

After a jury trial in Somerset County, Norris was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.  Norris appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting the motion to dismiss the Penobscot matter without prejudice because the resulting delay violated Norris’s right to a speedy trial under the Maine and United States Constitutions and (2) denying his motion to suppress because the warrants were not supported by probable cause and law enforcement did not comply with the requirements of M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(g).

Joshua R. Savage appeals from a judgment of the Unified Criminal Docket convicting him of manslaughter (Class A) and aggravated operating under the influence (Class B).  Savage argues that (1) a search warrant to obtain his medical records and blood and urine samples from him was not supported by probable cause because the affidavit in support of the warrant relied on purely non-criminal behavior and (2) the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.

Tara L. Watson appeals from the sentences imposed on her for her conviction of unlawful possession of cocaine base (Class C), refusal to submit to arrest or detention (Class E), and violation of condition of release (Class E).  Watson argues that the sentencing court (1) “invent[ed] sentencing standards out of thin air” and placed her conduct on what the court called a “mythical continuum” of the ways in which the crime could have been committed and (2) failed to consider mitigating factors, such as her guilty plea, showing acceptance of responsibility, soon after being charged. 

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The Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded Risk Management Pool appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court requiring it to provide to the Human Rights Defense Center documents showing that it paid $30,000 to settle a lawsuit against Kennebec County and ordering it to pay the Defense Center’s attorney fees.  The Risk Pool argues that the Superior Court erred in (1) determining that the Defense Center’s amended complaint, which added the Risk Pool as a defendant, “related back” to the date of the Defense Center’s original complaint and was therefore timely; (2) determining that the Risk Pool could not challenge the timeliness of the Defense Center’s appeal by relying on new evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing; and (3) finding that the Risk Pool acted in bad faith.

Meggan Pratt appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction review that challenged her conviction for domestic violence assault against her child on the ground that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Pratt argues that (1) the post-conviction court erred in determining that trial counsel did not act unreasonably by stating in the opening statement that Pratt was going to assert a parental-discipline defense, thereby opening the door to evidence about Pratt’s parenting, and (2) she suffered prejudice from the combination of trial counsel’s opening statement and trial counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial error.

Alexander Russell appeals from a judgment of the Unified Criminal Docket convicting him of gross sexual assault (Class A), gross sexual assault (Class B), unlawful sexual contact (Class B), unlawful sexual contact (Class C), and unlawful sexual touching (Class D).  Russell argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his request to instruct the jury that a poor-quality police investigation into the alleged crimes can raise reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt; (2) failing to give a specific-unanimity instruction; (3) instructing the jury that they could consider whether there was evidence of a motive or lack of motive for any witness to lie; and (4) increasing his sentence because of his “lack of remorse” when there was no evidence to support a finding of a “lack of remorse.”

Brian J. Fournier appeals from orders of the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) (Duddy, J.) (1) dismissing his claims against Flats Industrial, Inc., and three individual fellow shareholders (collectively Flats) for breach of fiduciary duty and (2) denying his motion to amend his complaint for a third time. Fournier argues that the BCD erred in (1) determining that amending his complaint for a third time would be futile; (2) determining that his direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty was not a proper direct claim but was a derivative claim, given that he had alleged that the other shareholders had denied him his right to vote as a shareholder; and (3) dismissing his derivative claim given that Flats’s denial of his request to the corporation to take action on some of his claims was wrongful, and he was not required to make a request of the corporation on all his claims because making a request on the remaining claims would have been futile.

Flats moved to dismiss Fournier’s appeal as untimely because the appeal was filed more than 21 days after the stipulation of dismissal that disposed of the last of Fournier’s claims against them. The Law Court ordered that the motion be considered with the merits of the appeal. Fournier argues that a motion for a protective order that Flats filed with the stipulation of dismissal prevented the stipulation of dismissal from constituting a final judgment.